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Editorial: Juristische Grundlehre 100
Zsolt Ződi*
At the end of 2017, a workshop was held in the Institute for Legal Studies, Centre for 
Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest to celebrate the 100th 
anniversary of the publication of Felix Somló’s Juristische Grundlehre. This issue contains 
the written and highly reworked versions of the lectures of the workshop.
The Grundlehre is Somló’s magnum opus. It has been labelled as a piece within the 
series of the general legal theories (Allgemeine Rechtslehre) – a genre that blossomed in 
German-speaking legal science at the end of the 19th century. Grundlehre is a special work 
from several points of view. It can be seen as the last in the allgemeine Rechtslehre genre, 
yet it is also the first continental book that is based on John Austin’s command theory and is 
also the entrée of Neo-Kantianism into Hungarian legal philosophy. Moreover, Somló 
prepared an excerpt from his book, as a textbook and was the first Neo-Kantian jurisprudence 
university textbook in Hungary.
For Hungarians, Somló’s Grundlehre is more than a piece of positivist, Neo-Kantian 
system from the beginning of the 20th century – it symbolises a period, within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire when a chance emerged to gain on Western Europe and the standards of 
Western-European science. Somló, himself, was, for a long time, a leading figure of this 
progressive, pro-Western, democratic, liberal movement of the century-turn; a propagator 
of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy and a great admirer of the modern sociological theories. 
For different reasons, at the end of the first decade of the 20th century, he made a Neo-
Kantian turn and started to deal with ‘pure’ science: value philosophy, and general problems 
of legal philosophy. The Grundlehre is a 556 pages long summary of this period. After the 
publication of the book at Meiner Verlag in Leipzig, Somló practically stopped writing 
longer pieces. In 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and in 1920 his home, 
Kolozsvár (more recently known as Cluj-Napoca) was cut from Hungary and given to the 
Romanian Kingdom. Shortly afterwards, he committed suicide in the cemetery of his 
hometown.
In the conference call the same question was posed that Péter Cserne, the reviewer of a 
recent book on Somló edited by Andreas Funke and Péter Sólyom, asked ‘Does Somló 
belong entirely to the past or is there a possibility for a 21st century dialogue with his 
work?’1 The authors of the workshop finally gave no straightforward and simple answer for 
this question as there are parts of the theory which are still worth for study, but there are 
parts which has proven to be wrong or became obsolete.
In the call, the contributors were asked to focus on three topics: 1. Juristische 
Grundlehre in the context of the legal philosophies of its age; 2. The picture of legal science 
in Juristische Grundlehre and the main concepts within Grundlehre and 3. The impact of 
Juristische Grundlehre. Although, not every paper is a complete fit to this concept, some 
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very valuable insights have been made, all of which complement the already existing, some 
respects, very distorted and one-sided Somló portrait.
The issue starts with a paper from Andreas Funke, one of the well-known expert of 
this field.2 The paper is seeking the answer to the question ‘What is left from the heritage 
of Somló?’ His answer is that more exists than is commonly thought of or what is visible 
from the first glance. The innovation of Somló’s theory, as stated by Funke, is that it is 
‘a kind of inquiry which only defines and unfolds a single concept, namely the concept of 
law’. A further important innovation is that it is grounded on the concept of norm. It is even 
more important that this theory is compressed into one book in a very concise manner. 
This is a pure theory which is serving as a blueprint, a ‘radicalisation’ and purification of 
Bierling’s idea, which was packed with meta-juristical elements. Funke claims, that Somló 
left a significant footprint on German legal theory. Besides the explicit references, like 
Merkl’s, Somló’s distinction of ‘legal form concepts’ and ‘concepts of the legal content’ 
still has a significance – it has been used by Merkl but later on by Kelsen as well. It is still 
in use today. An even more important invention of Somló is the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between legal power and the subordinates as a ‘legal relationship’. This was 
not used until World War II but soon became commonplace within the German 
administrative law after the war. In the 19th century, and in the beginning of the 20th, the 
science of administrative law in Germany used the different concepts of subordination, 
instead of legal relation. Funke reveals, that in the reception of the ‘administrative legal 
relations’ doctrine Heinrich Rupp played a central role in the ‘50s, and he explicitly refers 
to Somló in his work.
Zsolt Ződi’s paper seeks to answer the question if the Grundlehre really a ‘carbon-
copy’ of John Austin’s Province of Jurisprudence Determined3 or it is really a substantial 
document. To obtain an answer, he analyses three general questions, ‘building blocks’, all 
playing a fundamental role in both theories: (1) The place, role, methodology, and 
use(fulness) of their theory, and the role of jurisprudence in general within the system of 
legal sciences; (2) The definition of norm in general, (as genus proximum of the law), the 
relationship between different norm-types and (3) The concept and the distinctive features 
of the law itself.
Ződi concludes, that Somló did not copy but rather adapted the Austinian theory. 
He used Austin’s concepts of sovereign and command to conceptualize the law but 
developed this concept in many points and in important respects. Firstly, his theory was 
more intended to be a contribution to the legal science rathter than a manual for practitioners, 
like Austin’s work. Secondly, he used Kantian and Neo-Kantian concepts and current 
German legal science ideas of the time in order to keep distance from Austin’s empirical 
foundations. His method was also inspired or influenced by phenomenology. Thirdly, this 
new conceptual framework enabled him to explain the structure of modern law on a more 
profound way. Primarily, he developed the concept of promissory law, with which he can 
explain the theory of rights and duties, as well as constitutional law in a more proper way 
than Austin. His further important innovation was that he realized the systematic character 
of law. Applying this notion to international law, he could give a more sophisticated answer 
than Austin’s ‘positive morality’. With these innovations, he is an important forerunner of 
the twentieth century positivist legal theory.
2 See Funke and Sólyom 2013.
3 Austin (1873).
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Miklós Szabó’s article in the issue comprises two interconnected topics. The first is an 
interesting biographical parallel of Somló and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, who nearly lived 
at the same time and their life were striking similar. This gave the idea to Szabó to compare 
not just their lives, but also a problem which was central in both author’s oeuvre – the 
concept of right and duty.
Szabó’s starting point is, that ‘(f)or both Anglo-American and European Continental 
streams of positivism, the problem of rights culminated in the question of whether rights 
are possible without a foundation in positive law.’ Both authors were reliant on Austin’s 
framework, who created the basic structure of the theory of right. According to Austin, right 
and duty is the same notion considered from different aspects. Bierling, at the end of the 
19th century went on with this concept, stating that Rechtsanspruch and Rechtspflicht (legal 
claim and legal obligation) are the two sides of the same coin. This starting point is accepted 
by both Hohfeld and Somló. While Hohfeld then extended this relationship to four types of 
right-duty relations in his theory with the state (sovereign) playing no role, Somló’s theory 
of right and duty has the Rechtsmacht (Legal power, Sovereign) at the center. Introducing 
the category of promissory law, besides the command-law, Somló states that the right of the 
subordinates are not only correlations of the obligations of the opposing parties but the 
command and the promise of the sovereign generates both rights and duties for different 
parties within different legal relations, in different fields of law. Therefore, Szabó concludes 
that Somló and Hohfeld ‘moved in two different lanes’ but ‘the bend of their lanes were 
parallel’. Hohfeld followed the common law path, which was private law centered while 
Somló cleaned up the concepts of rights and duties in a continental, public law centered 
way.
Péter Sólyom wrote an article on Somló’s connection to the doctrinal school of public 
law of Hungary of the time and that how the debates of the time are reflected in the 
Grundlehre. His starting point is, that ‘Somló takes position on a number of conceptual 
issues within the framework of his foundational legal doctrine, which were in the focus of 
contemporary debates on Hungarian public law.’ Sólyom argues, that in 1867 a school 
of public lawyers emerged in Hungary, who, using Somló’s terminology were all doing 
‘general theories of positive law’. This doctrinal movement cannot be regarded as a mere 
branch of German state-law positivism. Within the Hungarian context, the doctrinal 
approach counted as a progressive and consistently liberal movement, in contrast to the 
conservative historical school. Sólyom presents three points within the debates, (1) the 
theory of the public personhood of the state and its reception (2) the constitutional 
relationship between Hungary and Austria (3) the legal or non-legal nature of fundamental 
laws and the problem of constitutional identity.
Concerning the first point, Somló’s theory is very modern and it ‘goes beyond Jellinek 
and draws on Kelsen’s early work and argues that will-based theories of public-law 
personality are inherently flawed. The personality of the state is but a legal construct, which 
can be best understood using the concept of imputation: ‘The legal order is the content of 
state will, that is, the law is the will of the state.’ Sólyom concludes that Somló’s ‘discussion 
of legal obligation and legal claims, in particular, could have served as the basis for a later 
doctrine of public-law rights, because Somló’s book belongs to those works that tried to 
make the conceptual field of the law capable of accommodating liberty-extending views 
under the legal and political conditions of a constitutional monarchy, then considered as 
given.’ However Sólyom also notes, that Somló’s work still did not make any considerable 
impact on Hungarian public-law scholarship. ‘The reason is due not only to his premature 
death but also to the interwar developments: Following a short consolidated period of 
142 ZSOLT ZŐDI
moderate autocracy, Hungarian public-law scholarship sacrificed its respectable traditions 
on the altar of reuniting the country.’
Péter Takács’s paper analyses a rather neglected topic – Somló as a theorist of state. 
Takács claims, that though Somló ‘never had published works exclusively on questions 
of the state’, ‘he actually had several theories of state during his lifetime’: namely three. 
The first underpins his work from 1903, (State Intervention and Individualism), the second 
is in Juristische Grundlehre and the third remained in a scattered form. From this third, 
only two papers were published, the remaining part, a 500-page, long manuscript, was only 
published after his death.
The second point is the most interesting from the point of view of this issue. Takács 
states, that ‘(t)he Juristische Grundlehre deals extensively with issues of the theory of state 
in two instances: The main section analyses legal power (Die Rechtsmacht) in the framework 
of the concept of law while the second section the problems of the state (Der Staat) are 
discussed under the title ‘elements and consequences of the concept of law.’ Somló’s 
theoretical standpoint is on one hand Kantian: ‘no definition of the state can be created 
without including that of law’, but he complements the other side of his theory, aying that 
‘there can be no definition of law that would not involve that of the state.’4 This delicate 
relationship is reflected also in the fact, that Somló is using both empirical-factual and 
normative elements for defining the state. The empirical elements are mainly borrowed from 
Austin. Takács argues, that this two-sidedness causes certain tensions within the theory of 
Somló. For example according to Somló ‘the state can commit infringements only if the 
legislative power had already tied itself vis-à-vis its subjects in the form of ‘promissory law’.
The final paper by Trevor Wedman invites the reader to re-read Somló. Wedman’s 
starting point is that contemporary versions of positivism rest on four presuppositions. 
‘(i) the Kantian categorical imperative is an ‘empty formula’; (ii) any attempt to objectify 
an ought results in subjecting to logic a category which is illogical; (iii) the only object of 
rational thought in the social realm are interests and conflicts of interest which can only be 
solved through ordering the interests one against the other and (iv) if there would already 
exist societal order on the basis of reason, then it would be foolish to develop a theory of 
legal positivism’. According to Wedman, both Hart and Kelsen, two representative figure 
of 20th century positivism, ‘are united in their opposition to the possibility of validity 
actually inhering within a legal order’ and ‘are both the heroes of current mainstream legal 
theory […] and the main antagonists of (the following interpretation of) Somló’s conception 
of law.’
According to Wedman, Somló is theorizing the sovereign in a more fruitful and 
consistent manner than Kelsen or Hart. ‘Somló’s definition of law quite clearly follows 
Austin’s conception of law as the commands of a sovereign which enjoys a habit of 
obedience. However, whereas this Austinian framework is typically interpreted as ‘imperial’ 
or hierarchical in nature, Somló gives the Austinian frame a decidedly non-imperial, non-
hierarchical flavour.’ The reason why Somló’s definition of Sovereign is more subtle, is that 
he is not postulating the sovereign as a kind of omnipotent God, but rather as one power 
within the world of different competing powers of human collectives also enacting rules of 
behaviour for their members.
Furthermore, Wedman says, that Somló’s most important innovation was, that he 
‘insists that the ‘generalized’ quality of the law, i.e., a sovereign, and therefore also a legal 
system can only exist if it encompasses a sufficiently broad scope of human conduct, results 
4 Somló (1920) 70.
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in the fact that no one legal norm can be understood or even conceptualized as an isolated 
entity.’ This ‘plural tantum that governs the relation between the individual and the 
collective.’
In referring to Somló’s last work, the Gedanken5… Wedman claims that Somló has a 
theory of language, inspired by Bolzano. Somló is introducing the distinction between 
logical sentence (sentence of meaning) and grammatical sentence (sentence of speaking). 
‘What is interesting about this distinction for Somló is that it seems to lead him to a theory 
of legal norms quite unlike other theories held by his Neo-Kantian contemporaries and 
unlike any other legal theorists since, but which, at the same time, predicts a significant 
strand of the philosophy of language in the 20th century, […] best exemplified by 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of language, use and meaning in the Philosophical Investigations.’
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